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HE report of the Commission on Money
and Credit [8] deals, in Chapter 2 on
"National Economic Goals," with the objec-
tives of policy. The main staff papers relevant
to that chapter are those by Chandler [i],
Klein [a],andthe Scitovskys [6]. The same
chapter deals in a general way with potentiali-
ties —theextent to which the goals are likely
to be achieved in future. A full assessment of
the potentialities, however, requires evaluation
of the effectiveness of the instruments of policy
and the efficiency with which they can be or
are likely to be used, and raises in particular
the questions concerning recognition, adminis-
tration, and operation lags to which this morn-
ing's panel was devoted. The report does not
face these issues squarely: Chapter 9, on "The
Choice and Combination ofPolicy Instru-
ments," by-passes the critical problem of eco-
nomic diagnosis, confines itself largely to plati-
tudinous or semitautological observations on
how policy instruments should be used, and in
its final conclusion that "aggressive, imagina-
tive, and integrated use of our instruments of
stabilization policy is necessary within a frame-
work appropriate to a healthy growing econ-
omy" [8, p. 258] falls back in effect on the hope
that if the economic authorities behave like
good Americans all will be well. Nor does the
report discuss the question of the monetary
standard within the context of objectives and
potentialities.Instead,apart from passing
references to the need to avoid inflation for
balance-of-payments reasons, it deals with ob-
jectives in isolation from the problems of inter-
national equilibrium associated with the fixed
dollar price of gold, reserving these problems
and their solution for discussion in a separate
chapter (Chapter 8, "International Monetary
Relations"). The separation of domestic from
international policy problems is a crucial weak-
ness in the report, and conceals serious possible
conflicts between policy objectives.
It is instructive at the outset to notice two
broad differences between the treatment of
objectives contained in the C.M.C. Report and
that to be found in the report of the Radcliffe
Committee Thefirst is that the Radcliffe
Report lists four major general objectives of
policy —ahigh and stable level of employment,
reasonable stability in the value of money, eco-
nomic growth, and stability of the exchange
rate;the C.M.C. Report lists only three —
"reasonableprice stability," "low levels of un-
employment," and "an adequate rate of eco-
nomic growth"; and the omitted objective,
given the Commission's strong endorsement of
the present dollar value of gold, is balance in
the balance of payments. The second, closely
related difference is that the Radcliffe Report is
much more explicit about the possibility of con-
flict between the policy objectives it distin-
guishes, and the need for the conflict to be re-
solved by compromise. The C.M.C. Report
(and to a greater extent thestaff papers,
notably the Scitovsky paper) does recognize
the possibility of conflict, but it devotes its
major efforts to the contention that its three
objectives are compatible with one another;
and where it does recognize a clearcut possi-
bility of conflict —betweenprice stability and
low unemployment —itdodges the issue by
relying on the pious hope that other policies
designed to improve the competitiveness of the
economy, or enlist the economic statesmanship
of union and business leaders, will permit the
conflict to be resolved.
The omission of external balance as a policy
objective, and the relegation of discussion of
how to achieve it to a separate chapter on "In-
ternational Monetary Relations," both falsifies
the true nature of the objectives of U.S. eco-
nomic policy and conceals serious possibilities
of conflict between objectives.The present
International Monetary Fund system attempts
to operate a regime of fixed but infrequently
alterable exchange rates with an inadequate,
and inadequately growing, stock of interna-
tional reserves. The United States plays a dan-
gerously vulnerable role in that system, in view
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both of its large capital outflow commitments
and of its assumption of the functions of a
reserve currency country.In affirming that
"the present dollar price of gold should be
retained as the central pivot in the exchange
rates structure among IMF member countries"
[8, p. 231], the report is, first, virtually guar-
anteeing the continuation of chronic problems
of international liquidity, and second, ensuring
continuing problems of serious conflict between
the objectives of U.S. policy.
The arguments for and against the present
international monetary system are too intricate
a subject to enter upon here. I would, however,
venture the comment that American thinking
on this subject, like British, is prone to exag-
gerate both the value of the commercial profits
derived from conducting an international bank-
ing business, and the political and economic
advantages of being a middleman for the in-
vestment of other countries' savings, as well as
the moral virtue of assuming the responsibili-
ties of reserve currency country.But itis
prone to underrate the restrictions on the free-
dom of domestic policy that the reserve cur-
rency role entails. Be that as it may, insistence
on maintaining the present price of gold leaves
the United States three alternative methods of
balancing its international accounts. One is to
persuade other countries to undertake the ad-
justments required to preserve international
equilibrium, by adjusting their domestic price
levels or exchange rates to the U.S. gold price
level, and by pursuing appropriate international
lending policies.This solution is implied by
the Commission's remarks on multilateral poli-
cies for adjustment [8, pp. 230—31]; but given
the jealousies to which the assumption of world
leadership inevitably gives rise, together with
the moral judgments that now enter so largely
into the discussion of exchange rate changes,
this alternative is likely to be a dangerous (and
humiliating) one to depend on. The second
alternative is to rely on domestic policy meas-
ures to adjust domestic prices and incomes to
the requirements of international balance.It
must be emphasized that, contrary to the im-
plication of various scattered remarks in Chap-
ter 2andelsewhere in the C.M.C. Report, this is
not simply a matter of maintaining price sta-
bility.To combine low unemployment with
balance-of-payments equilibrium may require
sharp changes in the gold price level in either
direction, depending on trends in the levels of
income and prices prevailing in the rest of the
world; and there is no reason for expecting
that a high rate of growth alone will keep a
country sufficiently competitive internationally
(in terms of nonprice characteristics ofits
products) to enable its international payments
to be balanced at a stable price level. The price
behavior required to preserve balance-of-pay-
ments equilibrium for an economy growing at
a high level of employment depends in a com-
plex way on the nature and rate of growth in
that country and elsewhere, and on the others'
price trends.It cannot be summarized in the
simple prescription of price stability; to assume
that it can amounts to assuming that the balance
of payments will somehow be looked after in
another way.
The Commission rejects the policy of main-
taining external balance by the methods of
general economic control, on the grounds that
"the costs in terms of unemployment and lower
growth would be so great from trying to correct
our balance of payments deficit by general
monetary and fiscal policies that alternative
means should be sought to achieve the neces-
sarybalance"[8,p.227].Thisleaves
the third alternative, which comprises a va-
rietyofselectiveinterferenceswith trade
and payments, and devices to insulate do-
mestic from international policy.The anal-
ysis of the report makes considerable use of
two suggested insulatory devices, each ques-
tionable though on different grounds. One is
that debt management and monetary policy
can be used to keep short rates high to discour-
age capital outflows, while keeping long rates
low to encourage growth. Theoretical reason-
ing and empirical research and experience raise
serious doubts that much can be achieved along
these lines. The other is that, by using deficit
financing rather than monetary expansion to
promote high employment, long rates can be
kept high enough to deter capita' outflows.
This notion, besides raising the question of the
political practicability of deficit financing, tends
tooverlookpossibleadverseconsequences
upon attainment of the objective of growth.
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seems to me to attach quite inadequate weight
to the seriousness of the balance-of-payments
problem, and to take far too sanguine a view
of the extent to which the problem can be
solved by various forms of tinkering which
will not seriously conflict with the main objec-
tives of domestic policy, including the vac-
uously-stated objective of "a desirable degree
of economic freedom and reliance on the market
mechanism for the allocation of products and
resources" [8, p. 9].
The report, like national policy in the past
few years, is grasping at expedients rather than
facing the problem squarely —whichmeans,
fundamentally, taking a really hard look at the
implications of the fixed exchange rate system.
The danger of this procedure inheres in the fact
that, regardless of how firmly asserted the prin-
ciple is that the balance-of-payments problem
must be solved without sacrificing the domestic
objectives of employment and growth, interna-
tional balance is the one objective of policy the
necessity of whose achievement is imposed on
the policy makers by strictly economic consid-
erations, and whose nonachievement calls eco-
nomic pressures into play which ultimately
force the policy makers to act. The other three
objectives —pricestability,low unemploy-
ment, and growth —areessentially politically-
imposed objectives, the sanctions for which are
applied remotely, through the ballot box; and
in the case of growth, the effects of failure to
grow rapidly impinge on the voter's conscious-
ness so remotely that the objective can scarcely
be said to have any direct political force behind
it. The serious danger is that through a com-
bination of refusal to face the conflict between
external balance and internal objectives, a pref-
erence for palliative tinkering in external eco-
nomic relations, and the steady restrictive
pressure of external disequilibrium on policies
of domestic expansion, the country will drift
into the worst possible situation, one of chronic
balance-of-payments weakness combined with
higher average unemployment and slow growth.
Even worse is the danger that, in the process
of drifting, the employment and growth objec-
tives will be so watered down, and the price-
level objective so reinforced by the balance-of-
payments problem, that the levels of employ-
ment and growth actually attained will appear
as the maximums objectively feasible.There
are, unfortunately, already plenty of signs in
official thinking and pronouncements of this
process of adjustment of domestic objectives to
the balance-of-payments restriction.
In summary, given the Commission's en-
dorsement of the gold standard, its failure to
include external balance among the objectives
of policy is a major weakness in its analysis;
alternatively, the Commission ought to have
carried its emphasis on the primacy of domestic
objectives to the point of being prepared to
contemplate a change in the price of gold, or
the abandonment of a fixed gold price for the
dollar. Admittedly a unilateral change of this
kind would involve a serious disruption of the
present international monetary system; this is
all the more reason for giving careful prepara-
tory thought to how such disruption could be
minimized.
To turn to the three goals of national eco-
nomic policy the report does discuss, Klein's
introductory remarks on economists' fads
pp.1—4] are extremely pertinent in putting
these goals in historical perspective.Klein
points to the danger of overgeneralizing from
a brief period of historical experience. The
three goals of low unemployment, reasonable
price stability, and adequate rate of growth are
all derived from recent brief historical expe-
riences: low unemployment as a goal derives
from the 1930's, price stability and growth
from the late 19 50's. Of the two recently added
goals, it seems fair to observe that price sta-
bility is a goal generated by public opinion, to
which economists have responded by producing
ceremonially adequate theories of chronic in-
flation; whereas adequate growth is much more
a creation of the profession itself, a reflection
of the extent to which growth has become the
test of efficient economic performance under
the combined influence of the cold war and
concern with the underdeveloped countries.
Growth, as such, is not self-evidently an object
of policy in a free enterprise economy; and the
recent emphasis on the desirability of a high
rate of growth seems to me to involve grafting
on to a free enterprise system standards appro-
priate to a planned economy with military and
political ambitions. I am not arguing that U.S.
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high domestic rate of growth, but simply that to
pretend that it is a strictly economic goal can
only confuse the issue.(In this respect the re-
port is less honest than the staff papers, in fail-
ing to mention the political motivation for
growth.) Nor would I dispute the quite differ-
ent proposition that there are many high-yield-
ing investments in such things as education and
basic research that private enterprise will not
undertake, and whose undertaking by the state
will result in faster growth.
The "faddy" aspects of the goals of price
stability and growth are well illustrated by
some features of the report's discussion of
them. With respect to price stability, the re-
port begins by conjuring up the horrors of
hyperinflation; though it admits that hyperin-
flation is not a real threat in the United States,
and that arbitrary redistribution of income and
wealth is I at less drastic in a mild inflation, it
nevertheless sets the avoidance of even mild
sustained increases in the price level as a major
goal. In so doing it ignores the now large body
of empirical evidence to the effect that the arbi-
trary redistributions it abhors are difficult to
detect in mild inflations, and the theoretical
analysis indicating that economic behavior will
adjust to inflation. It ignores also the fact that
it mentions later that the upward bias in existing
price indexes makes it very difficult to be sure
that the upward movement of the indexes since
1953representsgenuine inflation. It is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the Commission has
been guided by the a priori conviction that infla-
tion is a terrible evil. With respect to growth,
"faddiness" is evidenced in the Commission's ex-
pressed belief that the rate of growth has been
inadequate, coupled with its inability to ex-
plain why it thinks so and its unwillingness to
state a target rate of growth.(The report's
only positive statement on this subject"A
growth rate below that which is obtainable in an
economy operating at a high level of employ-
ment of our human and physical resources and
at reasonably stable price levels is clearly not
adequate"[8, p. 37] —isa masterpiece of
high-sounding emptiness, quite apart from the
ambiguity of the word "obtainable;" it amounts
to saying that growth is not positively un-
desirable.
The goals themselves are not ultimate objec-
tives clearly related to a consistent concept of
national economic welfare but, instead, are
proximate objectives defined in terms of the
operating characteristics of the economy, whose
relation to economic welfare is not necessarily
very close or direct. Each goal is defined by a
modifyingadjective —"reasonable,""low,"
"adequate" —indicatingapproval of the rele-
vant characteristics of the economy's perform-
ance, evidently by public opinion or some sec-
tot of it.Just what satisfactory performance
amounts to precisely is discussed only in con-
nection with low unemployment. Despite the
noncomparability and imprecision of the goals,
the report asserts that they are equally im-
portant.Just how importance is assessed is
nowhere explained. The Commission clearly
does not have any operational definition in
mind; presumably it believes that all goats are
equal, but these are more equal than others.
Definition of the goals of public policy in
terms of popularly approved characteristics of
economic performance is perhaps the only legit-
imate approach in a democratic society, espe-
cially for a body like the Commission not en-
trusted with actual policy making. But to be
useful as a guide to intelligent policy making or
policy evaluation, a statement of goals in these
terms should be accompanied not merely by
recognition of the possibility of conflict between
objectives, but also by consideration of factors
relevant to making the optimal compromise in
cases of conflict. The report stops far short of
being useful in this respect. First, while it rec-
ognizes the possibility of conflict, its main argu-
ment is devoted to proving the compatibility of
objectives. The one conflict it recognizes as
likely —betweenlow unemployment and price
stability —itevades by appealing to other
policies, confidence in whose likely effective-
ness is not justified by experience here and in
other countries. (Incidentally, the report seems
to me to gloss over another conflict in its dis-
cussion of growth and inflation. The statistical
evidence it quotes —tothe effect that there is
no association between the growth rate and the
rate of price change for rates of price increase
between zero and 6 per cent, but that countries
with prices changes outside these limits ex-
perience lower growth rates —impliesthat
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gether, not that "there is no basis for believing
that inflation is needed to stimulate growth"
[8, p. 44].)Second, by confining the argu-
ment to the goals as defined by public opinion,
the Commission deliberately evades confront-
ing the problem of resolving conflictintel-
ligently, and offers public opinion no guidance.
The Commission regards the problem as one
one goal against the other;
since the rate of price increase, the percentage
of unemployment, and the growth rate are in-
commensurable, casting the problem in these
terms fails even to call attention to the need
for commensuration to resolve conflicts.
There are two possible approaches to effi-
cient resolution of a conflict of objectives, both
of which involve going behind the stated ob-
jectives to their economic content.I take the
conflict between price stability and low un-
employment as an example. One approach is
to attempt to attach economic costs of a com-
parable kind to the nonfulfillment of objectives
—say,the loss of income to the unemployed
as against the loss of real income and property
to the victims of inflation.The other is to
investigate whether the social losses from non-
fulfilment of an objective can be eliminated
or mitigated by institutional changes —inthe
case of inflation, by indexing and other meas-
ures surveyed in Holzman's paper [3], in the
case of unemployment, by more generous un-
employment benefits as Gaibraith suggested
in The Affluent Society [2, chapter 2 i]. Either,
or both in combination, would be likely to lead
to a more socially efficient resolution of con-
flict than reliance on an undefined social wel-
fare function containing the rate of price in-
crease, the level of unemployment, and the
rate of growth as arguments would be.
I have used the example of conflict between
price stability and low unemployment for a
particular reason: in spite of the Commission,
the staff papers, and a widespread agreement
among the profession, it does not seem to me
that the rate of growth belongs in the group
of objectives with the other two.Both the
rate of price change and the amount of un-
employment can, for purposes of broad anal-
ysis, be taken to depend on the level of ag-
gregate demand, and so to be amenable to
"monetary, credit and fiscal policies"; the fact
that they vary in opposite directions with de-
mand poses the crucial conflict of objectives.
But the rate of growth is a question of the
allocation of resources between current uses
and output-increasingactivity.The choice
between fiscal and monetary policy may in-
fluence this allocation; but there is no a priori
reason why, other things equal, the rate of
growth should vary with the average level of
unemployment. In particular, contrary to the
belief of the Commission and many economists,
there is no a priori reason for expecting a
higher normal level of employment, accom-
panied presumably by a higher rate of price
increase, to produce a higher rate of growth.
In analyzing this problem it is necessary to
recall that the rate of growth measures the
proportionate and not the absolute annual
incrementofoutput, and that one should
exclude the transitory effects of changes in
the percentage of unemployment.Put very
crudely in terms of the Harrod-Domar equa-
tion, the problem is whether a higher level of
employment and income will raise the average
proportion of income saved, lower the marginal
capital-outputratio,or(more realistically)
raise the savings ratio sufficiently to offset a
raisedmarginal capital-outputratio.Both
theory and empirical knowledge about these
relationships give little grounds for the con-
fident affirmative answer that many economists
are inclined to give, and that is echoed in the
report.
The report's conclusion that "measures to
stimulate aggregate demand to attain low levels
of unemployment are basic to an adequate rate
of economic growth" [8, p. 43] is derived by
extremely questionable arguments. The report
credits low unemployment with both the im-
mediate increase in output consequent on re-
duced unemployment, and the longer-run (but
still once-over) effect of lower unemployment
on the size of the effective labor force. The
only possibly permanent effect on the rate of
growth of output it mentions is a decrease in
the rate of reduction of hours of work, and
this begs the question of the difference between
real output and real income. The report rec-
ognizes that no firm conclusion can be reached
concerning the effect of low unemployment or
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the rate of growth of real GNP per man hour,
but argues that special policies for increas-
ing productivity can be introduced more easily
when unemployment is low. This may be so:
but the report loads the dice by assuming that
demand is fixed and not increasing with pro-
ductivity, so that increased productivity neces-
sarily releases labor, and by arguing in terms of
absolute rather than proportional increases in
the productivity of the economy.
Similar objections can be raised against the
Scitovskys' arguments [6]for high employ-
ment as a growth stimulator, which also rely
on countingtransitionaleffects.Using an
average multiplier,the Scitovskys calculate
the reduction in investment necessary to in-
crease unemployment by i per cent, find that
it amounts to io per cent of net domestic
capital formation, and argue that thiswill
reduce the rate of growth by io per cent [6,
pp. 8—9]. Apart from its gross overexaggeration
of the contribution of net capital formation to
growth, this argument overlooks the effect of
the reduction in demand on the denominator
of the rate-of-growth equation.
In the same way, Klein's initial argument
[4, p. 36] that, on the surface, growth and full
employment are complements confusesthe
maximization of potential output at a point of
time with increasing the growth rate.Klein
goes on to a more sophisticated argument, on
Harrod-Domar lines,to the effect that full
employment has reduced the U.S. growth rate
by encouraging high consumption [4, pp. 39—
40]; but his attribution of the fall in the ag-
gregate savings ratio to full employment is
not convincing. Only Chandler [i, pp. 44—9]
recognizes clearly that the rate of growth is
a question of the composition of output, and
that theory indicates no clear relation between
it and the level of activity.
I conclude that it has yet to be demonstrated
that lower unemployment as a normal situation
(in contrast to a movement from higher to
lower unemployment)isgoodforgrowth.
Nor do the report and staff papers suggest any
close relation between inflation and growth.
It therefore seems that the report's treatment
ofpricestability,low unemployment, and
adequate growth as comparable policy ob-
jectivesis a misclassification;that the ob-
jectivesespeciallyrelevanttoaggregative
economic policy are price stability and em-
ployment, only; and that growth should be
relegated to a position among the other ob-
jectives —economicfreedom,defense,equi-
table distribution —thatthe Commission re-
gards as desirable.
Though growth should not be ranked with
price stability and low unemployment as an
objective relevant to aggregative policy, growth
policy might still be relevant to the attainment
of these other objectives.The Commission,
as already mentioned, looks to policiesin-
creasing competition and to economic states-
manship to resolve the apparent conflict be-
tween price stability and employment.An
alternative policy(presumably what Klein
recommends [4, pp. 42—3], though he does
not spell out the logic adequately) would rely
on the conscious promotion of increasing pro-
ductivity to reconcile the rate of wage increase
at low unemployment with price stability. The
practicability of either solution seems doubt-
ful: enforced competition and voluntary "eco-
nomic statesmanship" are unlikely to be ca-
pable of overcoming a rate of price increase
estimated to be of the order of 4 per cent at
4 per cent unemployment p.'51; and it is
equally unlikely, even if the (Phillips) type of
relation between unemployment and wage-rate
change isreliable and independent of the
rate of productivity increase, that the latter
can be raised sufficiently by growth policy to
achieve price stability. Thus the conflict be-
tween price stability and low unemployment is
likely to persist. The economist is most likely
to contribute fruitfully toits resolution by
further study of how far the conflict is created
by our methods of measurement of prices and
unemployment, what the costs of alternative
compromises are, and how far the social costs
of nonfulfilment of objectives can be mitigated.
Appendix
This appendix presents some empirical evidence on
the observed relationship ietween unemployment and
growth rates.
Chart irelatesannual average growth rates of real
GNP to average annual unemployment percentages for
the United States, for peak-to-peak National Bureau
reference cycles.If anything, the Chart shows a posi-2
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Cycle dates: NBER reference-cycle peaks.
Growth rates: Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in She
United States (C.E.D., 1962), p.17.
Unemployment percentages: 2910—48, Stanley Lebergott, "Annual
Estimates of Unemployment in the United States, in The
Mea.eurement and Behavior of Unemployment, Special Conference 8,
Princetonfor NBER, 5957, pp.255—26;5948—60, The Economic
Report of She President, 1962, p. 230.
CHART 2. —ANNUALAVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF REAL
GNP AND ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF UN-
EMPLOYMENT FOR PERIODS WITH EQUAL TERMINAL
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, UNITED STATES, 1909—49
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CHART I. —ANNUALAVERAGE GROWTH RATES AND
ANNUAL AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PERCENTAGES,

























tive relationship between average unemployment and
the growth.rate: the location of the point for 2929—37,
relative to the majority of the other points, and the
relationship of the points for 2948—53, 1953—57, and
1957—60, suggest the contrary relationship, and may
constitute the empirical basis of the view disputed in
the paper, that high employment promotes growth.
The data in Chart i are undoubtedly distorted 'by the
fact that successive cycle peaks are characterized by
substantiallydifferent percentages of unemployment.
Chart 2relates annual average growth rates of real
GNP to average annual unemployment for the United
States, for periods for which the unemployment per-
centage was the same in the initial and final year.
Chart 3relates Kuznets' long-run average decadal
growth rates of production per capita in various coun-
tries to their average unemployment percentages.
None of these charts shows any definite clear-cut
relationship between the growth rate and the unem-
ployment rate.They therefore support the doubts
expressed in the paper concerning the appropriateness
of including growth with price stability and low unem-
ployment as objectives of economic policy.
CHART 3. —INTERNATIONALCOMPARISON OF AVERAGE
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NoTE: All unemployment percentage averages end with —
— theterminal data of the Galenson-Zeliner estimates —andstart with
the intitial year indicated except for Canada (initial year 1916).
Souscx:
Growth rates: Simon Kuzneta "Quantitative Aspects of the Eco-
nomic GrowthofNations,I.L'evelu andVariability ofRates of
Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. V, No. i, 0 1 234 567 89 10 111213Oct. 1956, pp. 38—40.
Average annualunemployment(per cent) Unemployment percentages:(Canada, Denmark, Sweden, United
Kingdom): W. Galenson and A. Zeliner,"International Comparison
SouRcE: of Unemployment Rates," in Measurement and Behavior of Unem-
Growth rates: Denisoo Sources of Economic Growth, p. ployment, pp. 4s5—s6.
rates: 'Lebergott,"Annual Estimates of Unem- U.S.A.:Lebergote, "Annual Estimates of Unemployment," pp.
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Franco Modigliani's comments on the burden
of the debt suggest to me that one must be
especially careful with statements that are
likely to be interpreted by the general public
as saying something that is false, even if their
esoteric meaning to those who can read the
small print is beyond reproach. We all know
the story of the traveling salesman who says
to his rival, "You tell me you are going to
Pinsk this week so that I should think you
are going to Minsk, but you are really going
to Pinsk, you liar!"I hope this example of
how a true statement can mislead will not give
the impression that I think that itis Mo-
digliani's intention to deceive. But I do wish
to point out that his statement that the na-
tional debt is a burden on future generations
is almost certain to be interpreted as support-
ing the man-in-the-street's understanding of
these words —anunderstanding that I am
sure Modigliani would condemn as strongly
as I would.
The man in the street thinks of the national
debt as the debit entry on the government's
ledger —thefact that the government owes it.
His conception of the burden consists of con-
cern about the existence of this debit item in
analogy with concern about his own debts, and
of concern about taxes that may be imposed
to service the debt. His error lies in failing to
see that from the social point of view the
debit item, the existing debt of the govern-
ment, is canceled by a credit item, the exist-
ing credit of the public, namely their owner-
ship of the government debt certificates; and
in failing to see that if any taxes should be
imposed on future generations for servicing the
debt they could only be used to make payments
to members of the same generation living at
the same time.Modigliani is perfectly clean
of these primitive errors. His argument is an
entirely different one. But in using the same
words as the man in the street, he makes it
easy for the latter to claim support and so he
incurs some responsibility for the propagation
of error —evenif it is only in the manner of
the man who contributes to the stealing of his
car by leaving the key in the ignition.
Modigliani's concern is not at all about the
debit item in the government's ledger, but only
with the credit item in books of the owners of
the government securities.His worry is not
that the country is poorer because the govern-
ment owes so much but that the public is
richer because it owns so much in government
paper. The government debt (read "private
credit") is no burden. On the contrary it is
a boon. The private wealth makes the public
so much better off that they are induced to
take out some of the benefit in better current
living by saving less. The burden that Mo-
digliani is concerned with is borne not by the
future generations that inherit the national
debt, or even by any future generations that
may pay taxes to service it, but by genera-
tions in the further future that inherit less
capital goods because of the high life enjoyed
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would not be diminished if the national debt
were magically dissolved(aftertheinter-
mediate generations had had their good time)
so that no taxes could be called for to service
it.On thecontrary,thegenerationthus
magically relieved of the national debt would
suffer doubly. It would find itself not only with
less productive capital but also with less pri-
vate (claims to) wealth.
Modigliani's burden arises essentially from
an asymmetry that is the opposite of the one
imagined by the man in the street. It is due to
the awareness by the public of the credit side of
the national debt-credit without any adequate
awareness of the debit side which is on the
books of the government. This is what makes
them less thrifty.Being richer, they are in
less need of savings.
There are a number of questions on the
esoteric side, such as whether the same argu-
ment would not apply in similar or perhaps in
greater measure to private debt incurred by
corporations that are unable to finance growth
out of profits, or whether there is not the same
lack of offsetting private debt in the burgeon-
ing of private wealth from the marking up of
private speculative or "growth" stocks. (That
the private investments may be socially pro-
ductive is as irrelevant as the possibility that
the government expenditures might have been
socially productive.)But I cannot go into
thesequestionshere.Ican onlydeplore
Modigliani's having joined the recent fashion
of irresponsibly clothing ingenious new theories
in redefined old words so that they lend them-
selves to be paraded as rehabilitations of an-
cient fallacies.
In the matter of the treatment of national
economic goals I find myself in close agreement
with Harry Johnson,. although it seems to me
that the safety valve for prejudices and special
interests provided by the footnotesinthe
Report ofthe Commission on Money and
Credit save it from the more complete bogging
down in compromises and platitudes that char-
acterizes the Radcliffe report.I would put
even more emphasis than he does on the failure
to face up squarely to the balance-of-payments
problem and the resorting to ineffective ex-
pedients because of an unwillingness to con-
sider the possibility that it may be necessary
to sacrifice the tieto gold —orrather the
remnants of it that we have left.Such cling-
ing to the memory of the international system
that was the gold standard I have elsewhere
called "sentimental internationalism."For it
is unreasonable to suppose that changes in the
conditions of international trade and capital
movements will always be such as to protect
our balance of payments and enable us to meet
our costly and continuing foreign obligations
for aid to allies and for economic develop-
ment, or that the necessary adjustments could
be achieved by the relative deflation of our
wage and price levels.If we remain addicted
to sentimental internationalism we will find
ourselves in the position of the Jew who was
told by the local tyrant that he could choose
between eating a dish of stinking fish, receiving
a hundred strokes of the whip, or paying a
thousand ducats. The Jew said he would eat
the fish but got so sick that he was unable to
eat more than three quarters of it. He then said
he would take the hundred strokes, but by the
ninetieth he was near death, so he paid the
thousand ducats.
If we fail to free ourselves from the fixed
exchange rate we shall have to beg, borrow,
or steal to cover the unfavorable balances we
may incur. We have already suffered severely
from our attempts to beg other countries to
relieve us from some of our international
obligations. We shall encounter similar dif-
ficulties if we keep on borrowing money, hot
or cold, to cover deficiencies in our balance of
payments. We shall then have to resort to
"stealing."First, in the sense of engaging in
"beggar my neighbor" restrictionist policies,
until the relief is ended by retaliatory restric-
tions by the beggared neighbors (while the
evils remain both for us and for them). Then,
in the sense of beggaring ourselves by engi-
neering sufficient depression in our own country
(by fiscal or monetary measures) to induce
the decrease in imports that would correct our
balance of payments. Finally, there will be a
domestic revolt against this "cross of gold" and
we shall be forced to submit to the devalua-
tion we tried to avoid by attempting to swallow
the "stinking fish."
I would also agree with Harry Johnson's
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Raising the standard of living of the average
American is certainly much less urgent even
than the "secondary" objectives like freedom,
defense, or equitable distribution.
The most important issue raised is the con-
flict between the remaining two primary ob-
jectives of monetary policy: a high level of
employment and a stable price level. Harry
Johnson suggests that we should concern our-
selves not with finding the best trade off be-
tween unemployment and inflation but with
mitigating the evils.I do not see why one
should have to choose between mitigation and
optimum trade off.Indeed itis only when
the mitigation possibilities are fully exploited,
and we have thus minimized the evils of the
various degrees of unemployment and inflation,
that we have the measures of the alternative
evils to be traded off and can rationally ap-
proach the problem. Measures for increasing
productivity are of course eminently desirable
for obvious reasons, but it is not at all clear
that they will help much in relieving the pres-
sure for wages to increase more rapidly than
productivity (with adjustments for conceivable
changes in profit mark-up rates).Thisis
partly because increases in productivity raise
the sights for increases considered reasonable
or legitimate, and partly because of the ratchet
effect between (i) wage increases based on
productivity in high productivity-gain indus-
tries, (2)wageincreases based on equitable
adjustments in low productivity-gain indus-
tries, and wageincreases based on price
increases brought about by (2).
Therethus remains the unavoidable neces-
sity for deciding where to trade off unemploy-
ment against inflation. A 5 per cent per annum
inflation means that a fraction of 5percent
of the national income is unjustifiably shifted
from some members of society to others. The
total shift cannot be more than 5percent,
while some of it goes in desirable directions
and much of itis in opposite directions and
cancelsout.Certainly complete compensa-
tion of those harmed could not come to more
than about i per cent of the national income,
and even that would be not a net social loss
but a transfer. Aper cent depression means
theper cent absolute loss of output that fails
to be produced as a result of about 2 per cent
of excess unemployment (i.e., above the 2per
cent that seems to be necessary for a free
economy to be able to work). It would there-
fore seem that i per cent of excessive employ-
ment should be considered at least as bad as 5
percent inflation. Yet the present policy in
this country seems pretty clearly to be to ac-
cept all the unemployment that is necessary
to achieve price stability, as if any degree of
inflation is worse than any degree of depression.
It seems to me that President Kennedy's
anger at the attempted increase in the price of
steel was due to his having thought that he
had bought price stabilityfor6 or7per
cent unemployment and found that it had not
stayed bought.It seems to me, too, that the
widespread feeling that it was a good thing for
the President to have stopped the steel price
increase but that it was a bad thing for him
to have used such a concentrated mobiliza-
tion of executive powers and threats to achieve
it, is an encouraging step in the direction of
recognizing that the alternative to arbitrary
authority is the rule of law; that only the
development of rules for preventing such price
and wages increases and for enforcing such
prices decreases as would have been prevented
or enforced by a competitive market can
achieve the desired ends without calling for the
undesired means; and that only when such
regulation of wages and prices becomes po-
litically possible will we be able to achieve
both goals —ahigh level of employment and
a stable price level.